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DLR Institute for Air Transport Systems, Blohmstr 20. Hamburg, Germany 21073 
This paper describes the technical characteristics, lifecycle emissions and economic competitiveness of a 
hypothetical liquid natural gas (LNG) powered turboprop when introduced into a market place with both 
existing turboprops and potential competitive responses between 2025 and 2030.   Natural gas possesses vast 
potential to reduce emissions and improve operating costs in commercial aviation because it is cheaper and 
cleaner than jet fuel.  The results show that LNG turboprop can completely robustly against current 
turboprops (ATR-72 and Bombardier Q400), the competitive responses of stretched derivative of the Q400 to 
90 seats, and against discounted used version of current turboprops.   Specifically, the LNG turboprop can 
achieve between a 9% and 15% operating cost advantage compared to current turboprops, 4.9%-8.9% 
against a stretch of the Q400 turboprop, and, a 3%-11% advantage against existing turboprops sold or leased 
at steep discounts.   The program is shown to be profitable and yield a positive internal rate of return on 
invested capital between 9% and 17% if market share levels between 47% and 75% are achieved.    
Nomenclature 
ARJ = Advanced Regional Jet 
ATR = Avions de transport regional 
LNG = Liquid Natural Gas 
HAL = Hindustan Aeronautics Limited 
I. Introduction 
NG is a cryogenic fuel that has the potential be used as an aviation fuel. It is attractive from both an economic 
standpoint and a lifecycle emissions standpoint but has technical difference that require an all new fuselage and 
thus new aircraft design. The 90 seat turbroprop market is an early adoption candidate due to its recently announced 
availability of new engines and because 4 out of the 5 potential entrants require a new aircraft design.  This paper 
will examine the economic implications of the LNG’s fuel cost and new aircraft design on market share, and other 
competitive forces that could impact the success of an LNG turboprop program.  
 
II. Market 
There is currently a projected market for 1,3401 turboprop aircraft with 90 seats over the next 20 years worth 
approximately $26.52 billion at likely final aircraft acquisition prices.  90 seat LNG turboprop aircraft will consume 
approximately 540,000 gallons of LNG (270,000 of equivalent jet fuel) per year worth $0.4-$0.5 million dollars per 
year per aircraft at US LNG industrial and retail prices.  Storage and delivery infrastructure for LNG fuel would be 
required at 1 new airport for every LNG aircraft sold or roughly 670 airports at $2 million per airport assuming a 
50% market share ($1.3 billion).  Turboprop customers are typically airlines that service short distance routes (under 
300 nautical miles).  A turboprop program will require the availability of lease financing.  Leases account for half of 
all commercial aircraft financing and existing lessors may be hesitant to finance an aircraft that can initially use a 
limited infrastructure deployment because there is no guarantee that sufficient infrastructure will exist after the lease 
for the operator can liquidate the asset in a secondary market.   A total of $13.25 billion in lease financing would be 
required to fund 50% of the maximum possible number LNG turboprop aircraft purchases.  
The market size for supersonic aircraft for over-water supersonic travel only is estimated at a total of 500 
aircraft2 worth approximately $22.5 billion.  Authorization of overland supersonic flight could be authorized if 
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technical advances for low boom technology matured sufficiently.  Supersonic aircraft would require 40 main 
airports world wide for overwater travel only – 630 fewer airports than the turboprop.  It is unclear if lease financing 
for supersonic aircraft would be required--most charter airlines invest their own capital in aircraft but lease financing 
could make purchasing in LNG aircraft more attractive for the first customers.   
. 
III. Turbo-Prop Characteristics and Technical Differences from using LNG 
Turboprop aircraft are known for their fuel efficiency, low external noise footprint, and versatility in using short 
runways.  They also known for the their relatively slow speed, small cabins, cabin noise, lack of baggage 
compartments and a qualitative “less modern” feeling amongst customers.   Turboprops have lost market share to 
regional jets within the last 15 years but still remain popular in many noise constrained areas, developing countries, 
and with cost conscious airline customers.  
LNG aircraft require unique fuselage shapes to store the lower density LNG without an economically prohibitive 
drag penalty.  As a consequence, existing fuselage shapes cannot be used but the wing parasite drag can be reduced 
with thinner airfoils because no jet fuel needs to be stored inside.   The unique fuselage shape can also be designed 
to increase passenger comfort and make the aircraft more competitive with regional jet cabin sizes.  Changes in the 
wings and fuselage shape rule out the possibility introducing an LNG aircraft by making small modifications to 
existing aircraft however existing, engines can be used if the combustor is retrofitted to burn natural gas---a practice 
that commonly occurs when designing natural gas power generators from natural gas aircraft turbines.     
The use of existing engines can remove up to 75% of the development cost of a new engine.  The use of LNG 
has also been observed to prolong engine life and reduce maintenance costs by 15% due to the lower sulfur content 
of the fuel.  The LNG is vaporized before entering the engine and combusted as a gas or literally, natural gas.  The 
low temperature of LNG presents an opportunity to improve engine efficiency through cooling of inlet air and bleed 
air.  It may be possible to exploit some of these cooling advantages with an existing engine but it is likely that a new 
engine will need to be developed for LNG propulsion to reach its full potential.   
LNG’s environmental qualities will make it an attractive option for environmentally conscious airlines and for 
airlines that must operating within a carbon tax and trading environment such as the European Union. LNG emits 
between 10% and 80% less carbon on a life cycle basis depending on the extraction source of natural gas.  
Additionally, at least 80% less sulfur, NOx, and particulate matter regardless of the extraction source.   Turboprops 
also cruise at an altitude that does less harm to the environment then turbofan powered aircraft (jet engines).   A 
turboprop LNG aircraft would easily be the “greenest” commercial aircraft in operation and would provide a 
compelling marketing platform for LNG and a positive response with regard to the authorization and use of LNG 
from policy makers that seek to reduce climate change and improve the environment. 
IV. Background on Competing Turboprop Aircraft and Potential New Entrants 
Avions de transport regional (ATR) (Airbus’s (50%) & Alenia Aermacchi’s (50%)) and Bombardier, occupy strong 
incumbent positions in the 80 seat turboprop market with the ATR-72 and the Dash-8 Q400 respectively.  Both 
aircraft have sold well: Th ATR-72 averages 31.96 orders per year3 , and the Dash-8 Q400’s averages 32.27 orders 
per year4.   
 
ATR aircraft is currently considering a new turboprop design. The cabin/fuselage for the ATR-72 is too narrow to 
stretch to 90 seats without the tail hitting the ground on takeoff.  The requirement for a new fuselage design creates 
an opportunity for ATR to integrate LNG into an all-new design without the opportunity cost investing less in a 
stretched derivative.   They have publically stated that development costs would total $2 Billion but this would 
require ether shareholder approval from Airbus, or, engineering and financial resources from another source such as 
KAI who is also looking to partner.   ATR has indicated a desire to move forward with a 90 seat turboprop but the 
Airbus CEO has effectively vetoed the plan in favor of keeping Airbus’s development resources focused on the 
Airbus commercial jet aircraft.   Alenia, the other shareholder has also expressed interest in buying out Airbus’s  
share of ATR and developing the aircraft alone.  
 
Bombardier can stretch their Q400 aircraft to 90 seats which would present a low cost alternative to any all new 
design and would not suffer a drag penalty because the cross section would remain narrower 4 abreast instead of the 
wider 5 abreast design suggested by ATR.  The current Bombardier Q400 has a considerable speed advantage over 
the ATR which could translate into a competitive advantage if it could be offered at the lower cost of a derivative 
aircraft.  The current Q400 has also been configured seat 86 passengers in a single class configuration--much closer 
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to the 90 seats that the market has called for which may negate the need for a derivate aircraft all together.   
Bombardier has been in talks with the South Korean Aerospace Industries to possibly co-develop a 90 seat 
turboprop as late as 2012 but these talks seem to have faltered.   Currently Bombardier seems to commit all of its 
development resources to its C-series regional aircraft which are similar in size but come with new engine 
technology and can be stretched to compete with single aisle jet aircraft from Boeing and Airbus.   Several regional 
airlines have placed orders for the C-series which could cut into the market share of any new turboprop developed 
by Bombardier.  
 
New entrant turboprop aircraft from state backed entities are in varying stages of development.  The AVIC MA700 
program was formally launched by China in Q4 2013 and is currently accepting orders for an entry into service date 
of 2018.  Turboprops may be especially attractive to China because they can help reduce air pollution.   Orders form 
the MA700 are expected to come primarily from “developing countries in Asia and Africa”.  The HAL Regional 
Transport Aircraft from India is in development for both a turboprop and a regional jet but little is known about its 
progress.  New entrant programs from developing countries have notoriously longer lead times than programs from 
established companies but they do tend to be sold at lower prices. 
 
Regional jets have seen growth that has provided large windfalls for incumbent manufacturers Embraer and 
Bombardier, as well as new entrants from Russia’s Sukohi, China’s ARJ, and Mitsubishi.  Regional Jets are less fuel 
efficient that turboprops but have been adopted more rapidly:  2435 regional jet orders since 1994 1306 ATR’s, 
1129 Dash 8’s vs. 2689 regionial jets since 2001: E jet 1012, CRJ 1677.  
 
V. LNG Aircraft Eco System 
Creating both of the fuel and the aircraft markets will require launching a compelling LNG aircraft program and 
the presence of a supporting eco system of financing, maintenance, and fueling infrastructure.  The creation of the 
supporting eco-system can be handled by existing third parties that currently provide the same functions for jet-
fueled aircraft. The maximum amounts of capital that can be committed to each part of the eco system and the likely 
profit margins are shown in  
Figure 1.  It is important to emphasize that while each element in the eco system needs to exist for market to be 
created, new capital may not be necessary as some elements can be converted by their existing operators with little 
to no additional capital at all.  However, the figure does show the potential areas and additional profit margins can 
be attained if there is a desire to make investments and own assets beyond the aircraft program itself.  
 
Figure 1. The required elements LNG Aircraft Eco System, maximum potential capital requirements and 
anticipated profit margins 
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At a minimum, a small scale prototype, LNG fueling infrastructure, and aircraft financing (aircraft leasing) will 
also be required to create and sustain the LNG aircraft and fuel markets.   A small scale prototype and intellectual 
property protection would cost $5-$15 million USD and typically have a 0% profit margin unless the intellectual 
property is licensed or the company is acquired for its intellectual property.  For this reason, prototypes are typically 
funded by public entities such as NASA, and DLR, or, with internal R&D funds of an established company.  There 
is enough LNG extraction and liquefaction capacity available to service the LNG aircraft market.  However, the last 
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mile of fueling infrastructure, or, infrastructure that brings LNG to airports is not yet in place in most places around 
the world.  For small scale aircraft (<10,000 gallons of LNG per airplane), the last mile of infrastructure can be 
installed for $1.7 million to $2 million USD per airport, or $1.3 billion USD for all of 670 airports that are serviced 
by the LNG turboprop market. This infrastructure would consist of off site storage of 10,000-20,000 gallon LNG 
tanks and 1 LNG refueling tanker to bring LNG to the airport for each aircraft.  We assume a profit margin of 10% 
for this service with the final retail delivery cost being 50% less than the equivalent amount of jet fuel for the same 
mission. Lastly, aircraft leasing required to finance up to 50% of commercial LNG turboprop purchases (the 
maximum amount we think would be needed) is $13.25 billion USD.   Leasing has by far the largest potential 
capital investment but also has consistently high profit margins at 20%.   There are as would be expected, several 
highly profitable leasing companies that are well capitalized, but it is unclear if they will finance aircraft LNG 
aircraft before enough fueling infrastructure is in place to create a large secondary market to liquidate the aircraft 
after each lease expires. 
 
VI. LNG Infrastructure 
New permanent airport infrastructure can be a substantial economic barrier to entry for any alternative fuel and/or 
transportation concept.  Airport infrastructure upgrades for the A380 alone totaled $927 million USD for 18 US 
airports for an average of $51 million USD per airport and a minimum of $2.3 million USD for the Tampa 
International airport.  These infrastructure changes included new runways, taxiways and gates5.   LNG however does 
not require permanent airport infrastructure to service airport or investments on the scale of the average A380 US 
airport investment. 
LNG quantities under 10,000 gallons can be delivered to an aircraft without any permanent airport infrastructure 
investments—well within fully refueling a 90 seat turboprop.  It is possible to add offsite infrastructure consisting of 
a storage tank and a delivery truck for approximately $1.7-$2 million USD per airport.  Under this concept, pilots 
would be able to make their fuel requests 30 minutes before takeoff in order to insure delivery and consideration of 
the latest weather updates.   A total of 1529 airports currently receive commercial aircraft service.  The maximum 
cost for adding LNG infrastructure every possible airport in the world would total approximately $ 3 billion USD.  
In reality, there is existing LNG infrastructure both for marine and ground transportation use that can also be used 
for airports.   Additionally, commercial airports in close proximity such as Chicago O’Hare and Chicago Midway 
could share common LNG infrastructure. 
VII. Development Cost Differences between LNG Aircraft and Jet A aircraft 
LNG quantities under 10,000 gallons can be delivered to an aircraft without any permanent airport infrastructure 
investments—well within fully refueling a 90 seat turboprop.  It is possible to add offsite infrastructure consisting of 
a storage tank and a delivery truck for approximately $1.7-$2 million USD per airport.  Under this concept, pilots 
would be able to make their fuel requests 30 minutes before takeoff in order to insure delivery and consideration of 
the latest weather updates.   A total of 1529 airports currently receive commercial aircraft service.  The maximum 
cost for adding LNG infrastructure every possible airport in the world would total approximately $ 3 billion USD.  
In reality, there is existing LNG infrastructure both for marine and ground transportation use that can also be used 
for airports.   Additionally, commercial airports in close proximity such as Chicago O’Hare and Chicago Midway 
could share common LNG infrastructure. 
 
From a research and development standpoint, the technical differences between Jet-A and LNG aircraft are mainly 
in the fuselage which must be of an alternate shape to store the LNG, and, the wing which no longer contains LNG.   
A new engine development is not required, but the engine combustor needs to be modified to burn natural gas.   The 
changes in development cost are calculated using the Markish model6.  The Markish model takes as an input, the 
percentage of increased or decreased development efforts relative to the original development effort for major 
subsystems and then computes the new development cost based on historical ratios of each subsystem development 
cost, and an initial total cost computed by the Raymer-Dapca IV model7.  The estimated percentage development 
cost changes and the final R&D cost difference vs. the baseline are listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1: LNG Aircraft Estimated Development Cost Differences 
LNG Aircraft Sub-system Development Effort Percentage 
of Jet A Subsystem Effort 
LNG Turboprop 
Estimated  
Development 
Cost ($USD)  
Baseline Jet A 
Turboprop 
development 
cost ($USD) 
Wing Empennage Fuselage Landing Gear 
Installed 
Engine Systems Payloads 
90% 100% 125% 100% 25% 110% 100% $2,442,156,174 $2,081,008,647 
 
The estimated cost differences result in an approximately 17% cost increase vs. an equivalent Jet A development 
program.  This cost difference is reflected in the operating cost difference from an increase in aircraft ownership and 
insurance cost.  It must be balanced by decreases in fuel and maintenance costs in order to be economically 
competitive.  Additional development cost differences result from an assumed increased use of composites in the 
LNG program in order to make the specialized fuselage shape.   The model’s predicted baseline cost of the Jet-A 
turboprop program is within 4% of the cost predicted by ATR in public statements3.   However, it should be noted 
that a considerable amount of uncertainty is also present in these estimates that result from differences in actual vs. 
predicted engineering design choices, material selection, and how the engine development cost is accounted for. In 
our model, we assume that the Raymer model includes the development costs for a new engine, and that the LNG 
aircraft would only assume an additional 25% of those costs for the combustor modification.  Nevertheless, these 
costs are a high level estimate which is needed to accurately compute the overall operating cost differences.  
 
VIII. Competition Aircraft Prices vs. Potential LNG Aircraft Prices 
LNG turboprop aircraft face a complex competitive landscape of two well established incumbents ATR and 
Bombardier, potential new entrants from state backed entities in China, India and South Korea, and from low cost 
regional jets with the same passenger capacity.   Although both state backed entities and incumbent manufacturers 
have indicated some desire to enter the 1340 aircraft market for 90 seat turboprops, this analysis indicates that a 
maximum of 2 entrants will be profitable because 30-40% market share is required to break even on development 
and manufacturing costs (see profitability section).  A graph showing the possible price range for an LNG 90 seat 
turboprop aircraft vs. incumbent aircraft and future regional jets is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Aircraft Acquisition prices per Available Passenger Seat 
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The prices for the LNG aircraft range reflect a range of allowable manufacturing profit margins.  The lowest 
price/profit margin is an industry typical 50-50 split of the cost savings from using LNG between the airline and the 
manufacturer and comes out to a 5.7% manufacturing margin.  The highest price represents the margin that will give 
airlines equal operating costs with a jet-fueled turboprop and comes out to a 25% margin for the manufacturer.  A 
third price, a 20% margin, is shown for comparison purposes.  In the range of potential margins, the LNG turboprop 
is priced above smaller incumbent turboprops (the Q-400 and ATR72) and close in range with future regional jets 
(the future Embraer E2- series and the future Bombardier CS100).  However, in all of the LNG pricing scenarios, 
the LNG aircraft will have lower or equal overall operating costs than incumbent turboprops and future regional jets 
on all routes less than 300 nautical miles because the higher acquisition cost is mitigated by lower fuel and 
maintenance costs.  
IX. Pricing Pressure from Competing Aircraft & LNG Aircraft Cost Advantages 
It is important to note that operating and acquisition costs relative to new and existing aircraft are not a complete 
predictor of the competitive prowess and market performance of an aircraft. The switching costs for stocking new 
spare parts (including engines), and training must also be accounted for as well as the possible discounts that 
existing manufacturers can give.  Aircraft lessors have noted that the new Bombardier CS100, a more fuel efficient 
third entrant in the market for single aisle turbofan aircraft is “hard to place” with airlines because lease rates of 
existing aircraft are less than half those of new aircraft that operating costs are mitigated by the additional 
infrastructure required for stocking spare parts8,9  
 
“At the Istat Americas 2013 conference in Orlando, Fla., Udvar-Hazy told Aviation Week, 
“it is not a family of aircraft,” and its better fuel burn will be offset by the infrastructure 
costs of supporting new avionics, engines and other systems. Moreover, lease rates for 
existing aircraft have dropped since the program's launch. “Today, you can get 6-7-year-
old A319s at less than half the monthly rate of a new CSeries,” he said. “So we have an 
aircraft that overall is not probably where it needs to be.” And when it comes to 
campaigns for new aircraft, Airbus and Boeing have made it clear that they are willing to 
use pricing as a tool to keep Bombardier away from their customer base. Some airlines 
are prepared to purchase older technology if the pricing is right, as evidenced by the likely 
announcement next week of a Ryanair order for 200 Boeing 737NGs for which the carrier 
is believed to have secured discounts well in excess of 50% over list prices”7.    
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
7 
The LNG turboprop fuel cost advantage is 3 times the size of Bombardier CS100 so the consequences will not 
directly translate into the turboprop market, but, this quote does show that competitors can compete against a new 
entrant with aircraft pricing changes.  Additionally, manufacturers selling older aircraft typically give discounts 
from published prices that are used in Figure 2.  One analysis of the financial statements of Boeing and Airbus 
showed that these discounts can average as much as 35% and be as large as 50%10 on programs that were 10-15 
years old.  However, airline customers typically pay the manufacturer in installments during the time between the 
order and delivery which can be 2-5 years and this can affect the perceived discount if the manufactures take credit 
for the order cash flow during each installment instead of at the final delivery time.   
The LNG aircraft manufacturer can also compete on price as the manufacturing cost of each new unit goes down—
known as the “learning curve affect”.  Estimated manufacturing costs by manufacturing unit are shown in Figure 3.  
The purchase price for each LNG aircraft is shown to be between $40-$48 million dollars for 90 passengers in 
Figure 2. The manufacturing cost reaches ½ of 48 million dollars at the end of the learning curve (unit 700).  At this 
point, the LNG aircraft manufacturer could offer similar 50% pricing discounts and remain profitable but this would 
not be possible until approximately year 10 of manufacturing (year 18 of the program) while other manufacturers are 
currently well past year 10 of older programs.    A new entrant, or a derivative aircraft with new engines would also 
have to wait until year 10 to offer similarly sized discounts.  However, a derivative aircraft would likely be sold at a 
larger discount, earlier in production due to the knowledge and low cost obtained in producing parts that are 
common to the previous “parent” aircraft.  Despite strong competitive forces from manufacturers, the LNG 
turbroprop aircraft can still be profitable if the right combination of market share and profit margin can be obtained, 
and enough airlines demand 90 seat turboprops to uphold a market size of 1340 aircraft instead of settling for 
smaller, existing aircraft. A list of possible profitability outcomes is discussed in the next section. 
  
Figure 3. Manufacturing Costs by Unit Number 
 
 
The LNG turboprop will have a competitive operating cost advantage due to the ability to set the price of LNG and 
the use of new engines (50-65% lower fuel cost, 15% lower engine related maintenance costs) in the turboprop 
market but the acquisition cost will likely be above the acquisition cost of existing and future aircraft of the same 
size which would offset some of the benefits.  Figure 4 shows an estimated cost breakdown for short aircraft routes 
in Europe.  This chart can be used to estimate the overall operating cost advantages from discounts in fuel cost, 
acquisitions, and other operating costs.  
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Figure 4. Estimated Aircraft Operating Cost Breakdown for European Airline Operations 
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The lower fuel cost and maintenance costs that an LNG aircraft can offer add up to approximately 18-23% operating 
cost advantage (17-22.1% overall from a 50-65% fuel cost discount, and 0.6% from a 15% engine related 
maintenance cost discount, (engine maintenance accounts for 4% of overall operating costs).   Approximately half of 
this advantage (8.9%) is returned to the manufacturer in the form of a higher acquisition price after financing, 
leading to a nominal operating cost advantage of between 9% and 14% for the LNG aircraft with a 5.7% 
manufacturing profit margin.  Competitors can compete against the LNG operating cost advantage with pricing 
discounts as large as 50% (of ownership costs) on older jet fueled turboprops which would equal 5%-6% of total 
operating costs, although this would still be roughly half of the LNG cost savings which includes LNG 
manufacturer’s profit margin.  In the case that an airline were given an aircraft for at no cost, they would only save 
11%, roughly inline with the potential LNG savings.  Thus, LNG turboprops will have robust overall cost 
advantages over older, existing turboprops even though they may be cheaper to acquire.  
 
In the case that airlines will only replace existing aircraft with a 90 seat turboprop (essentially the incumbent aircraft 
are no longer competitors because they don’t have a large enough seat capacity) and that replacement market is 
indeed 1340 aircraft, a new derivative aircraft with new engines would be the appropriate competitor for comparison 
(Perhaps a Bombardier Q400 derivative).  In this case, the acquisition price for the derivative aircraft would be 20-
30% lower than the LNG turboprop instead of 50%, but with 15% lower fuel consumption than the older incumbent 
aircraft—or in terms of the pie chart, a 15% savings of fuel with virtually no increase in purchase price (a 
conservative estimate to make the business case harder for LNG aircraft).  The total operating cost advantage over 
the older incumbent jet fueled turboprops would be 5.1% (from the fuel cost discount) roughly half to one third the 
advantage of the new LNG turboprop with new engines (9-15%).  In this scenario, the LNG turboprop would still 
have double to triple the overall cost savings over the potential future competitor and would likely achieve a 50%-
75% market share split against the new derivative aircraft.  The total comparative operating costs savings of future 
potential solutions relative to existing turboprops are shown in table Table 2.  The estimated operating cost 
advantage of the LNG turbroprop relative to future competitive responses and current turboprops is shown in Table 
3.   
 
 Figure 5 shows the operating cost differences by category and the influence each category has on overall operating 
costs.  The ownership costs difference (26%) is greater than the development cost difference (17%) due to costs 
associated with financing the aircraft purchase at 8.5% over 20 years.    
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Table 2. Comparison of Operating Cost Reductions of Potential Turboprop Solutions Relative to 
Incumbent Turboprops 
Operating Cost Reductions relative to Incumbent Turboprops (Q400 & ATR 72)  
Older jet fueled turboprops 
with acquisition price 
discounts 
New Q400 derivative Jet fuel 
Turboprop 
New LNG Turboprop 
5%-6% 5.1% 9%-15% 
 
Other factors that could offset this balance include the introduction of carbon taxes (which would favor LNG 
aircraft) the cost of training pilots on a new aircraft type in cockpit (which would favor the derivative aircraft), or the 
desire for higher profit margins.   The training cost advantage can be mitigated in part if LNG Turboprop 
manufacturer were an existing turboprop manufacturer and used the same cockpit as the previous aircraft with minor 
upgrades.  
 
Table 3: Comparison of operating cost reductions of LNG turboprops relative to likely competitive 
responses 
Operating Cost Advantages of a new LNG turboprop relative to future competitors 
Older jet fueled turboprops 
with acquisition price 
discounts 
New Q400 derivative Jet fuel 
Turboprop 
Current Turboprops 
3%-11% 4.9%-8.9% 9%-15% 
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Figure 5: Depiction of how LNG turboprop fuel, ownership, and maintenance cost differences translate to 
overall operating cost differences.  In this example the cost differences from each category result in an overall 
14.86 operating cost advantage vs. an existing turboprop. 
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X. Manufacturing Profitability 
The turboprop aircraft program profitability (includes all program costs including development, certification and 
manufacturing), and internal rates of return (IRR) implications for different manufacturing profit margins and 
associated market shares are shown in Table 4 and Table 5.  The internal rates of return are computed from 
discounted cashflows described in the next section.  The left column in both tables represents possible 
manufacturing profit margins, or, the revenue received the above the average manufacturing cost per aircraft.  The 
ownership costs in are equal to the manufacturing revenue plus the financing costs for an 8.5% interest rate that the 
airline would incur.   
Figure 6 is a comparison of program cash flows for an LNG turboprop under two different achieved market share 
scenarios, 23% (unprofitable) and 47% (profitable, 9.3% IRR).  The R&D/Certification period is assumed to be 8 
years long (7 years planned, 1 year delay).  Both scenarios also show negative cash flow in year 9, the first year of 
deliveries because the first aircraft manufacturing costs are higher than the purchase price due from starting at the 
beginning of the manufacturing learning curve.   
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Table 4: Undiscounted profitability after 20 years ($2.4 Billion initial investment required) 
Un-discounted 
profits 
 
Manufacturing Profit 
Margin 
Total # of Aircraft Built, Maximum Build Rates, Resulting Market Share  
 316 aircraft, 2.5 
aircraft per month: 
24% market share 
630 aircraft, 5 aircraft 
per month, 
47% market share 
1005 aircraft, 8.3 
aircraft per month, 
75% market share 
5.7% mfr margin (50-
50 split of cost saving 
benefits between 
manufacturer and airline) 
Not Profitable $4,265,524,201.87  
$7,818,669,957.21 
 
20% mfr margin $1,546,367,252.71 $7,729,047,300.75 $13,591,208,455.33 
25% mfr margin 
(maximum for positive 
airline ROI) 
$2,153,800,541.22 $8,940,069,363.29  
$15,609,578,559.57 
 
 
Table 5: 20 year internal rates of return (IRR) on capital for various market penetration and manufacturing 
profit margin scenarios for an LNG turboprop aircraft development and manufacturing program. 
Internal Rate of Return 
Grid 
 
Manufacturing Profit 
Margin 
Market Share, Total # of Aircraft Built & Maximum Build Rates 
 316 aircraft, 2.5 
aircraft per month: 
24% market share 
630 aircraft, 5 aircraft 
per month, 
47% market share 
1005 aircraft, 8.3 
aircraft per month, 
75% market share 
5.7% mfr margin (50-
50 split of cost saving 
benefits between 
manufacturer and airline) 
Not Profitable 9.3% 17.1% 
20% mfr margin 4.5% 14.0% 21.8% 
25% mfr margin 
(maximum for positive 
airline ROI) 
5.9% 15.4% 23.2% 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
12 
 
Figure 6. LNG turboprop program cashflows for various market shares 
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LNG Turboprop Cashflow:  316 Aircraft, 30 aircraft per year, 24% 
market share, 5.7% mfr margin  
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LNG Turboprop Cashflow: 630 Aircraft, 60 aircraft per year, 47% 
market share, 5.7% mfr margin  
 
 
Profitability Assumptions: 
• 20 year program life time  
• We do not factor in returns or upfront costs from selling fuel, leasing aircraft, or selling maintenance 
services.  
• 7 year development and certification program and a 1 year delay with revenues from sales beginning in year 
8.  
• A ramp up period for the first and first and second years of manufacturing (time to reach full speed 
manufacturing), the full manufacturing rate listed in the table would not be reached until year 3 of 
production (year 11 of the program).   
• A slow down in manufacturing rate (ramp down period) is assumed for years 19 and 20 of the program 
• Manufacturing learning curve rates were estimated at 85% for labor, 95% for materials, and 95% for other 
expenses respectively.   
• R&D and certification costs were computed by assuming a 26% use of composites (for the new fuselage 
design and for the aircraft empennage), a 40,000 lb empty weight, a Mach .55 cruise speed, a 10-20% 
increased design effort for LNG fuselage and fuel system, and a new upcoming turboprop engine from GE9 
or Pratt & Whitney10 would be selected and retrofitted.   
• The R&D and manufacturing cost and cash flow model is based on regression equations computed by 
Raymer and the Rand Corporation11 from data on many previous US military aircraft programs and 
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corrected with cash flow and manufacturing data from Boeing described by Markish1 and inflation factors 
supplied by NASA.   
• Our cost model predicts a $2.084 billion development cost for a, jet fueled turboprop of the same size, in line 
with the $2 billion dollar estimate made public statements made by ATR, the market leader in commercial 
turboprops over 60 seats on the cost of a new design3.  ATR is a joint venture based in France which is 
50% owned by Airbus, 50% owned by Alenia Aermacchi 
 
XI. Conclusion 
The data shows there are many scenarios (combinations of achieved manufacturing profit margin and market 
share) which lead to profitability and a positive internal rate of return.  The most likely scenario (discussed in the 
“Pricing Pressure from Competing Aircraft” section) would result in close to a 50-75 market share with a 5.7% 
manufacturing profit margin.  This scenario would net a $4.2-$7.8 billion dollar profit and a 9.3%-17.1% internal 
rate of return.  A 24% market share is possible if enough airlines decide not to risk adopting a new LNG aircraft 
or large parts of the market are consumed by new entrants.   The best chance to increase manufacturing margin 
would be to sell to airlines that are subject to carbon taxes which would effectively increase the operating cost 
advantage of LNG aircraft relative to jet fueled aircraft.  Carbon taxes are currently implemented for all European 
Union (EU) flights and ICAO has plans for a global carbon tax, however global carbon taxes have often received 
pushback from airlines and been successfully defeated in the past.   Rises in crude and/or jet fuel prices could also 
increase manufacturing margins but we have based our analysis assuming that the LNG will be sold at 50% the 
price of jet fuel.  
References 
1 Perrett, B., “Five Manufacturers Proposing 90-Seat Turboprops” http://aviationweek.com/awin/five-manufacturers-proposing-
90-seat-turboprops, Aviation Week, August 5th 2013 
 
2 Moll, N., “With SSBJ, Aerion looks to revive supersonic flight” http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ebace-convention-
news/2010-04-28/ssbj-aerion-looks-revive-supersonic-flight, AINonline April 28th 2010 
 
3 ATR Aircraft http://www.atraircraft.com/newsroom/news-events.html 
 
4Bombardier:http://www.bombardier.com/content/dam/Websites/bombardiercom/supporting-documents/BA/Bombardier-
Aerospace-20140630-Q-Series-Program-Status-en.pdf 
 
5Commercial Aviation  Costs and Major Factors Influencing Infrastructure Changes at U.S. Airports to Accommodate the New 
A380 Aircraft, US Government Accountability Office, May 2006 
 
6 Aviation Week: Bombardier Says CSeries First Flight Will Boost Sales, March 18th 2013.  
http://aviationweek.com/awin/bombardier-says-cseries-first-flight-will-boost-sales 
 
7 Flight Global: Analysis: Lessors spurn CSeries Overtures, April 4th 2012.  
 
8 J. Morrison, “Game Theory Analysis of Aircraft Manufacturer Innovation Strategies in the Face of Increasing Airline Fuel 
Costs”. P.76 Report No: ICAT-2011-4, June 2011,  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
9 Alcok, C., “P&WC Preapres aer Momentu Builds for New-Gen Turboprop” http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/dubai-air-
show/2013-11-16/pwc-prepares-momentum-builds-new-gen-turboprop, AINonline, November 16, 2013 
 
10 Raymer, D, Aircraft Design: “A Conceptual Approach: Reston American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics”  
 
11 Markish, J. “Valuation Techniques for Commercial Aircraft Program Design”, Master’s Thesiss- Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge MA 2002 
 
 
